The European Commission has produced precise rules governing the computation of the cost of services of general economic interest (SGEI). The Commission has adopted a fully distributed cost approach where the SGEI can bear a "reasonable" share of the common cost. We highlight a possible inconsistency issue between this state aid case law and the antitrust case law based on an incremental cost approach. We also show the difficulty introduced by the identification of the common costs, relying on the example of the network of a postal operator providing commercial services and fulfilling an accessibility obligation.
Introduction
The European Commission recently adopted a range of measures intended to ensure greater clarity in the financing of public services. 1 The measures stipulate in particular the rules concerning the allocation of common costs shared between services of general economic interest (hereafter SGEI) and other (competitive) activities.
In establishing these rules, the Commission has applied its interpretation of a decision handed down by the European Court of Justice which defined the conditions under which the allocation of costs between La Poste and its subsidiary Chronopost satisfy European state aid law. The fully distributed cost approach adopted by the commission contrasts with the anti-trust cases where the European Commission, as well as national competition law authorities authorize not allocating common costs to competitive activities and thus allow all common costs to be incurred by the public service.
The Commission's approach with regard to State aid introduces symmetry between SGEI and commercial activities. In contrast to the anti-trust approach which authorizes the consumer of competitive activities to benefit from all scope economies generated by the joint provision of the SGEI, State aid jurisprudence authorizes only a proportion of this retrocession (which symmetrically authorizes the state to make savings by making the SGEI benefit from the existence of other activities). Such an approach introduces a new factor in the calculation of the threshold of transfer prices to commercial activities and requires a re-evaluation by corporate economists in charge of founding accounting methods used to construct the transfer prices system.
The purpose of this paper is to present the detail of the cost allocation rules in the SGEI and predation case-law and to expose some possible drawbacks of the commission's rules concerning state aids. The main drawbacks explored are the possible inconsistencies between the antitrust and the state aid case law, and the complexity of the analysis imposed by the commission.
Concerning the first argument, we show that the antitrust and state aid case law cannot be independent. The measure of cost used to evaluate the SGEI will have a direct impact on the pertinent test of predation. The traditional test, using the incremental cost, is incorrect when we use the commission case-law to evaluate the SGEI.
Concerning the second argument, we shall see that although the anti-trust rules do not require the evaluation of common costs between SGEI and commercial activities, "State aid" rules have made the distinction crucial. We will outline the difficulties raised by accounting allocation in the presence of externalities on the cost and demand function through an example that describes the methodology applied by La Poste to allocate the costs of its network between "commercial" activities and its accessibility obligation.
The allocation of costs between services of general economic interest and competitive activities: A state of art
European postal operators have traditionally discharged public services in addition to their commercial activities. The European Commission, the authority charged with ensuring that competition rules are observed, therefore faces a two-fold task in supervising the postal sector. On the one hand, the Commission must ensure that operators do not adopt anticompetitive behaviors on their commercial markets, whilst on the other, it must verify that public services are not over-compensated by Member States. Both concerns dictate an assessment of the cost of commercial and non-commercial activities carried out by operators. Here, we present the European case law addressing the issue of cost allocation between services of general economic interest (SGEI) and competitive activities. We begin with a presentation of the predation case law which appears to be the most settled. We will then consider whether such case-law is consistent with the case law arising from the review of State aids.
Antitrust case law
In theory, predation is defined as a price strategy which is profitable solely as a result of the increase in market power obtained by the predator in eliminating a current or potential rival. In practice, competition authorities use cost based rules to detect predatory strategies, 2 that is, an authority will conclude in the existence of predatory strategy in one of the undertaking's activities if the income generated by the activity does not cover the "pertinent" cost of the said activity. The existence of an SGEI attached to a commercial activity complicates the calculation of such a cost. The presence of economies of scope between competitive activity and the SGEI will do away with a sole definition of the cost of commercial activity. There will be a whole range of potential costs from incremental cost 3 to the stand alone cost 4 (Faulhaber, 1975) . Before applying the predation test, a competition authority will therefore have to define the concept of cost which is relevant. This is precisely what the European Commission did in its decision dated 20 March 2001 5 in which it stated that it would use incremental cost to define the predation of an undertaking operating on a competitive market and on a reserved market. The concept of incremental cost 6 is therefore used by the Commission to assess the cost of competitive activities undertaken by postal operators. This approach is consistent with economic theory: selling a good below its incremental cost generates negative profits, a suspicious act in a competitive context. 7 We briefly present below the context of the case which resulted in the ruling.
The case concerns a predatory strategy pursued by the historic operator in Germany, Deutsche Post AG (DPAG), on the market for parcels intended for mail-order sale. To apply the incremental cost test, the Commission had to assess the cost which would have been saved by DPAG if it had stopped providing the mail-order parcel service. The network used by DPAG to provide the service included 33 depot and sorting centers along with 476 distribution centers. The infrastructure was also used for private parcels forwarding business which was subject to a public service obligation, as well as for processing business-to-business (B2B) parcels. The cost of capital and maintenance for common sorting infrastructure could not be attributed to any one service and was therefore not included in the incremental cost of mail-order sales. Conversely, the labor costs could be allocated to mail-order sales according to the volume generated by the activity. Furthermore, the existence of a public service obligation lowered the incremental cost of mail-order business. For example, the obligation to deliver counter parcels in two days throughout the country meant that one link per day between each depot was vital. The cost of this daily transport could not therefore be allocated to the mail-order activity. In this case, the Commission found that DPAG had not covered its incremental costs on the mailorder market, which led it to find against DPAG.
This approach also appears, for example, in a predation case considered by the French Competition Council. 8 The case concerns the "Régie départementale des passages d'eau de la Vendée" (herein after referred to as the Régie), which was accused of having applied predatory prices during the summer period on one of its boats. The Régie was subject to a number of public service constraints which were more stringent during the winter, but did apply all year. The obligations included, for example, a daily service to transport 3 This is the cost saved when the undertaking stops producing the service in question but continues its other activities. 4 This is the cost that would be incurred by the undertaking if it produced the service in question but stopped the production of its other services. 5 COMP/35.141, (2001/354/EC) , decision concerning a predatory strategy pursued by Deutsche Post AG (DPAG). 6 The incremental cost applied by the Commission is the Long-Term Incremental Cost which includes incremental fixed costs. 7 A temporary cross subsidy can be justified, however, in the event of starting up a product or to create a network effect (see, for example Turpin 1992). passengers, merchandise and vehicles, as well as price reduction requirements. Even in the absence of competitive activity, the service continuity obligation meant that fixed costs for operating the boat (including the lease of the vessel) were not included in the incremental cost of the competitive summer activity. Similarly, the salaries of employees in maritime stations, as well as business costs incurred by counters and advertising were not included in the incremental cost. Only a proportion of insurance and vessel repair costs were considered incremental. The Council concluded that were was no predation (a conclusion confirmed by the Court of Appeal).
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It should be noted from both cases above that there was no identification of the incremental cost of the Service of General Economic Interest provided in conjunction with the commercial activity. Furthermore, fixed costs shared by the SGEI and the commercial activity are not identified. All the calculations concerned additional costs of commercial activity (or those which were avoided, which is the equivalent here).
State aid case law
In this section, we will outline the case-law concerning State aid. This jurisprudence itself is divided into two types of cases: compensation for general interest missions and control over transfer pricing.
Transfer pricing case law
The transfer price is the amount at which internal transactions of goods and services are carried out within a group, that is, between divisions in a given undertaking or between a parent company and its subsidiary. To use the example of a postal operator which has a competitive subsidiary specialized in parcels, the transfer price paid by the subsidiary to the parent company to use its infrastructure will determine the cost "passed on" to the subsidiary and at the same time will dictate the costs which must be met by the parent company. Transfer pricing case law therefore has the merit of establishing pertinent costs to assess both the SGEI and the activity subject to competition. The most recent case law in this field stems from the ruling handed down by European Court of Justice in the Chronopost case. 10 The case followed on from a complaint by Chronopost competitors concerning the provision by La Poste of logistical and commercial assistance to its subsidiary. The Court of Justice decided in its ruling that:
The Court does appear to be requesting that not only all variable costs (first part of the incremental cost) but also an appropriate contribution to the costs "arising" from the use of the network be attributed to the subsidiary. As the fixed costs "arise" from the use of the network to provide the subsidiary with the service, these costs are specific fixed costs which naturally form part of the calculation of long-term incremental costs. Naturally, this has meaning only if the "appropriate contribution" to specific costs is worth exactly 100%, so that the entire incremental cost is allocated. The Court stipulates that the price paid by Chronopost must cover remuneration of capital specifically attributed to competitive activity. The cost incurred by the immobilization is an integral part of the incremental cost of Chronopost activity. 
Public service compensation
Again in the simplified framework referred to in this paper involving a single operator using its network to provide a commercial activity on the one hand and an SGEI on the other. Let us now consider how an SGEI should be valued in light of the most recent law.
The ruling of the European Court of Justice handed down on 24 July 2003 in the Altmark case (C-280/00) defines the framework in which public service compensation is not deemed State aid by meeting four criteria. 12 The fourth criterion stipulates that the compensation must result from a "competitive tendering" or in the absence of such, must be based on a benchmark of costs by using those of an average, well-run undertaking. In the postal sector, infrastructures do not comply with a commercial rationality. 13 There are many arguments which can basically be encapsulated in the following: the uniqueness of such a network (irrespective of whether it is the distribution network or the points of contact) means that the application of competition or of a benchmark does not offer any answer to assess compensation. It is therefore frequently impossible to apply the fourth criterion when the SGEI uses the postal infrastructure.
In the instances where the Altmark ruling's criteria do not apply, the Commission has drawn up replacement rules which can be found in the "Community Framework for State Aid in the form of public service compensation" 14 (hereafter referred to as the "framework"). The "framework" stipulates in particular the manner in which the cost of an SGEI must be defined when the undertaking providing it also operates in commercial markets: 15 The costs allocated to the service of general economic interest may cover all the variable costs incurred in providing the service of general economic interest, an appropriate contribution to fixed costs common to both the service of general economic interest and other activities and an adequate return on the own capital assigned to the service of general economic interest.
The Commission also states that the cost must be diminished by the income generated by the SGEI. We will return to this point later. Whereas, the Chronopost ruling defined the cost of the SGEI as the stand alone cost, the cost of the SGEI is defined here as the incremental cost supplemented by a proportion of common fixed costs, a concept of cost known as the "fully distributed cost". Consistency with the Chronopost decision may be found in assuming that the appropriate contribution to common fixed costs is here the entirety of the common fixed costs, but this is not the approach adopted by the Commission. Another way of finding consistency within the state aid case-law is to consider another interpretation of the Chronopost ruling than the literal interpretation which we have given above.
11 This analysis will also make it necessary to establish a reference interest rate. 12 The first three criteria (which, in this paper, are assumed to have been met) are as follows: The undertaking has been entrusted with clearly defined obligations; The parameters for compensation were drawn up in advance objectively and transparently; Compensation does not exceed the costs incurred by the obligations (taking account of revenue and a reasonable profit). 13 The Court of Justice acknowledged this issue in the Chronopost case (cf. note 10). 14 OJEC, 29/11/2005 C297/4. 15 The Commission also stipulates in the framework that the calculation of costs must be based on "generally accepted accounting principles". It will be seen that the calculation of the cost of a general interest service can imply a complex economic analysis which exceeds such "generally accepted accounting principles".
Consistency within State aid case-law
A part of the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Chronopost case may be subject to interpretation. The Court requests that an "appropriate contribution to the fixed costs arising from use of the postal network" be allocated to the subsidiary. Instead of considering that these costs are the incremental fixed costs, one may prefer a non-literal interpretation and consider that these fixed costs are not specifically attributable to the activity in question but are shared with other activities undertaken by La Poste. This is precisely the interpretation of the Commission. Thus, in its "Banque Postale"
16 decision which analyses the cost allocation system implemented by La Poste, the European Commission stipulates that the "analysis of compensation for the provision of services by La Poste to its subsidiary uses the Chronopost ruling as its reference framework in light of the conclusions from Advocate General Tizzano in the same case", who concluded that: 17 State aid can be precluded if the price charged covered all the additional costs, fixed and variable, specifically incurred by La Poste in order to provide the logistical and commercial assistance (that is to say, direct costs) and an adequate part of the fixed costs associated with maintaining the public postal network (that is to say, common costs incurred in providing the assistance in question and also the universal service)
This conclusion unambiguously leads to allocating the fully distributed cost to the competitive service. This is also on the basis of this interpretation that the Commission developed its "framework" for compensations. In sum, both in transfer pricing cases and SGEI compensation cases, the European Commission will assess services of general interest at the level of their fully distributed cost.
Consistency between state aid and antitrust case law
We have seen that the commission will use the incremental cost to evaluate the competitive activities in the antitrust cases and will use the fully distributed cost to evaluate the SGEI in state aid cases. These two approaches are not consistent since some costs are allocated neither to the SGEI nor to the competitive activity. We will show here, why this inconsistency matters.
If the transfer price is set based on the fully distributed cost, in the accounting, the competitive activities will support a share of the common costs with the SGEI. The accounting, thus, can not directly be used to detect a predatory strategy. In the "DPAG" ruling 18 the Commission seemed to support this argument; the commission requested that the new subsidiary be charged DPAG services at incremental cost to make it easier to ensure the absence of anti-competitive behaviors. With the new ruling of the commission, predation is not directly apparent anymore in the accounting.
The argument presented above relies on the assumption that the predation test remains the incremental cost test. We shall see that this is not entirely true since the pertinent predation test depends on the cost used to evaluate the SGEI. The predation test consists in the comparison of the incremental cost of the competitive market and the incremental revenue of the competitive market. When the stand alone cost is used to evaluate and finance the SGEI, the incremental revenue of the competitive market is simply given by the revenue earned on this market. When the fully distributed cost is used to finance the SGEI, the computation of the incremental revenue is more complex. The subsidy only finances a share of the common cost, and the competitive market finances the complement. When the competitive market disappears, the state will have to finance the totality of the common cost. This means that the subsidy increases when the competitive market disappears, thus the incremental revenue of the competitive market is modified. Therefore, there will be predation if the incremental cost of the competitive market is superior to the revenue earned on the competitive market less the share of the common costs allocated to the competitive market in the evaluation of the SGEI. More simply, there will be predation when the fully distributed cost of the competitive market will be superior to the revenue earned on the competitive market.
If the fully distributed cost and not the stand alone cost is used to evaluate the SGEI, the predation test takes the form of a fully distributed cost test. This test presents a serious inconvenient. This test means that a diversification which generates less revenue that the fully distributed cost cannot be profitable (unless the firm has anti-competitive objectives). This also means that a whole range of socially optimal diversifications will be prevented.
It is also important to bear in mind that the cost allocation rules will have a direct impact on the operational decisions made by the managers of the firm, since these managers will rely on the same cost accounting system used for the regulation. Once this fact is taken into account, it is easy to understand that the costs allocated to the competitive activities have to respect a certain number of properties, for example, practicability and stability. It is important for the manager to know exactly what are the costs allocated to his products. The actual position of the commission does not seem to ensure this point. First, the manager is confronted to two different measures of the cost of his activity. The transfer pricing and state aid case law will allocate the fully distributed cost to his products while the predatory case law will allocate the incremental cost. The manager will have to juggle with the different notions of costs depending on the nature of his decision. Most important, the costs allocated by the state aid case law (the fully distributed costs) are not characterized by the necessary stability. For example, if the firm stops the production of a service, the other competitive activities will have to bear a bigger part of the common costs. The manager of a division will thus observe variations of his costs without any control on it, or even without any possible anticipations of these changes. It is even possible that a product become unprofitable without any real modifications of its demand or cost parameters, just because another division of the firm has just been closed.
Finally, the Commission approach requires firstly to establish the incremental cost of the SGEI and secondly to establish precisely the costs which are common with commercial activities in order to ensure "adequate" allocation. We shall see that this point sometimes makes it necessary to introduce detailed economic models in cost accounting. To illustrate this point, we will present the allocation of the costs of the retail network of La Poste between commercial and SGEI activities. The method described here, was approved by the Commission in its decision "banque postale". 
Conclusion
The cost concepts which can be used to assess services of general economic interest are summarized in the following table: Theoretically, a whole range of costs can be adopted to calculate the cost of a service of general economic interest which goes from incremental cost to stand alone cost. In this range, a single concept would make it possible to ensure consistency between assessing the cost of the SGEI and the cost of a competitive market in predation cases. This is the stand alone cost. The stand alone cost appears to be recommended by "price transfer" case-law in the Chronopost ruling. However, using a different interpretation of the ruling, the Commission assesses the SGEI at the level of its fully distributed cost in State aid cases (compensation and transfer pricing). There is therefore inconsistency in the Commission practice between State aid cases and predation cases. At first glance, one may believe that it is not awkward to judge predation and State aid using inconsistent concepts of cost, as they are two distinct issues. Several reasons, however, militate in favor of consistency.
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Sharing the postal retail network costs between an accessibility obligation and a commercial activity At a simplified level, all European postal operators can be regarded as fulfilling two major objectives through their network of counters. The first is commercial, in the sense that the counters network is the place where commercial products are put on the market: mail and parcel services. In many cases (and it is the case for La Poste), the network also provides financial services. In order to simplify the presentation in this article, we will group together all these activities under the generic term "commercial activities".
The second objective is an objective of accessibility relating to the universal service.
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This means that the network has a constraint in its sizing, whereby it must be of "sufficient" density. That implies that, without this constraint, the size of the network obtained by optimizing profits would be smaller. A certain number of Member States have objectivized this accessibility constraint with criteria of a minimum distance from the population to the offices, or of density of offices in urban or rural areas. In some cases, this commitment to the accessibility of contact points for the universal service is accompanied by a complementary commitment to proximity. This is the case in France, but also in the 20 Chapter 2 article 3 paragraph 2 of the Postal Directive of 97: "For this purpose, member states take steps to ensure that the density of contact and access points take the needs of their users into account". For the sake of simplicity, in the context of this article, we will not separate these complementary commitments, to which we will give the global name of "geographic accessibility".
Cost of the SGEI Cost of the commercial activity Predation case-law

Stand alone cost of the SGEI
The simplest cost concept to implement in this specific case is the stand alone cost. This cost is given by the difference between the total cost of the network and the incremental cost of the commercial activity. So, paradoxically, the stand alone cost of the SGEI will be found not by identifying it directly, but by calculating the incremental cost of the commercial activity, which is easier to obtain. Since the total cost is observable, it is necessary only to subtract this incremental cost from it to obtain the "stand alone cost" of the SGEI. The basic approach consists in first identifying all the time spent on commercial activity at the counter, and then to convert this time into costs. To refine the approach, it is necessary to take into account the operational time spent on the fringes of the counter (for example cash, accounting, …). To be exhaustive, it is also necessary to add periods of inactivity which are inherent in all commercial activity of this type. In the case of counter activity, an example is the time taken to go from one customer to the next. A more extensive analysis may result in adding more inactivity time in relation to queue management: La Poste has developed a model based on Erlang's law which enables calculation of the number of counters required to handle customer flow in accordance with reasonable objectives in terms of waiting time. 21 Additional periods of inactivity result from the random pattern of customer arrivals.
Apart from this modeling of inactive time, this exercise is relatively simple to implement. However, because of the rules set up by the Commission in its "framework", postal operators cannot use only this calculation. Since the stand alone cost is not a concept accepted by the Commission to evaluate a SGEI, it is necessary to find the common fixed costs, and then to share them "adequately" with the commercial activity.
Net avoided cost
On principle, in order to compute the incremental cost of the SGEI, it would be enough to refer to the Economics book and to calculate the stand alone cost of the commercial activity. The incremental cost of the SGEI is, then, of course obtained as a difference with total cost. We will see in the following section that this simplicity is only apparent, particularly when the mission generates externalities.
Literature
The approach involving the calculation of a net incremental cost 22 is better known in the literature under the name of "net avoided cost". This approach amounts to considering that the cost of the service of general economic interest is equal to the loss of profit for the operator caused by the exercise of the obligation. This loss of profit can only be measured if the operator's profits are compared for two given scenarios. An observable scenario which is one for which the corporation has an obligation imposed on it. And an unobservable scenario in which the operator is freed from the constraints of the SGEI. Several authors have acknowledged the importance of building this hypothetical scenario for assessing the cost of a universal service obligation. For example : Panzar, (2001) , Cremer et al (2000) who uses the expression "profitability cost", Jamison (1997) , and also Choné et al (2001) .
There are few practical applications of this methodology. NERA (1998) applies this concept to the universal obligation of postal operators. However, in this study which deals with the cost of maintaining unprofitable flows of postal traffic, there are no externalities from the SGEI on competitive activities. Put another way, abandoning a route will have no effect on the cost or traffic of the other routes. Building a reference scenario does not therefore require a complex methodology in this case. Examples of SGEI which show such externalities and which therefore require complex modeling have however been studied by the European Commission and the Court of Justice.
Treatment of externalities by European institutions
The first case concerns a state aid to Crédit Mutuel 23 by the French State. The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (French government department in charge of investing and lending public money) pays Crédit Mutuel a commission for the sums which this organization collects through its "livret Bleu" (Blue Bankbook). The Commission had to check that the sums paid to Crédit Mutuel did not exceed the costs which the latter had to bear to supply this product. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that Crédit Mutuel's monopoly on the "livret Bleu" enabled it to attract customers for other commercial services. The "Livret Bleu" was therefore alleged to enable Crédit Mutuel to increase the profits it makes in its commercial activities. The plaintiffs therefore claimed that these advantages should reduce the compensation paid to Crédit Mutuel.
The Commission did not reject this idea and on the contrary it actually confirmed it by having recourse to an expert to assess the amount of this advantage. However, despite the theoretical interest acknowledged by the Commission, the effect has not been finally incorporated in the calculation of the cost of the obligation owing to the difficulty of presenting an acceptable calculation methodology.
The second example comes from the telecommunications sector, the "universal service" directive 24 states explicitly that the calculation of the net cost of the universal service corresponds to the difference between the net cost borne by an operator when it supplies a universal service and when it does not supply one. The court of justice 25 decided in this context that the externalities of the universal service on commercial activities (for example, the brand image effect) must be taken into account when calculating the cost.
In the postal sector, several aids aimed at financing an accessibility obligation have been authorized by the Commission, but none seemed to be based on a methodology of net avoided cost type which integrates the effects of the externalities.
26 La Poste has implemented such an analysis in the context of the allocation of its counters network. We present this calculation, illustrated by a simplified numeric example. 
The net avoided cost of La Poste's accessibility mission
The net avoided cost of geographic accessibility is calculated as the difference in profit made by the network with and without the obligation. The total profit (turn-over minus costs) under the obligation is known since it corresponds to the current situation which is observable. The turn-over and costs related to an unconstrained network are however, not known and must be reconstructed. Construction of the reference scenario, which is the basis of the analysis in terms of avoided cost, will therefore consist here in determining the nature of La Poste network if the latter did not have constraints on the density of its contact points. This optimal network will be the one which maximizes the difference between the turn-over and the costs of the network. In order to determine it, it is necessary to know how the closure of a post office will impact the turn-over and the total cost of the network. Such an analysis starts with a study of the turnover carried over when post offices are closed. On the closure of a post office a certain proportion of the turn-over of that office is carried over to the nearby offices and a proportion is lost. This loss is modeled according to different parameters (for example, the presence of a competing bank). When the amount of the carried over income is known, La Poste estimates the cost of processing this business in the remaining offices, as well as the cost saved by closing the office. The costs of processing the additional activity in the remaining post offices take into account the management of waiting queue.
Since the variations in turn-over and cost that follow the closure of an office are known, it is only required to implement an optimization algorithm based on the repeated closure of offices, to find the network configuration that will maximize the difference between the turn-over and the costs of the network. As the unconstrained profit is now known, it is only required to calculate the difference between this profit and the profit constrained by the obligations of the public service (the observed profit) to obtain the opportunity cost of the mission.
Numerical example:
Here, we illustrate the net avoided cost methodology with a very simplified numeric example. The current situation in which La Poste must fulfill its accessibility obligation is characterized by the presence of two post offices which have the following characteristics (Table 2) .
In an unconstrained scenario, La Poste is authorized to close one of the two offices. In Post Office 1, the profit is 5, so this office would be open even without constraints. In Post Office 2, there is a deficit of 5. If this office is necessary for the exercise of the SGEI, it would be tempting to conclude that the net avoidable cost is therefore 5. But this naïve approach is not adapted when the mission generates externalities.
Office 1
Office 2 Turnover = 60 Turnover = 40 Fixed Cost and inactivity=35
Fixed Cost and inactivity=30 Cost of Activity=20
Cost of activity=15
Result : +5 Result : -5 When the second office closes, a part of its turn-over will be carried over to the remaining office. Let us suppose for example that the carrying over is half of the turn-over (we suppose that activity and turnover have a linear relation, therefore half of the activity is also carried over). The economics of the first office is transformed in such a way that there is also less inactivity, 27 and we obtain for example the following situation:
Office 1 Turnover = 80 Fixed Cost and inactivity=32.5
Cost of activity=27,5
Result : 20 In this new situation, the global network (here the remaining office) makes a profit of 20. So the accessibility SGEI has diluted the production function, in such a way that the total profit has fallen to zero. The net avoided cost is the difference of profit between the two situations, that is, 20. Certainly, the SGEI has created turn-over (the total turn-over is 100 in the network with two offices), but for the operator the additional turn-over is only achieved at the price of a marked loss caused by a dramatic increase of its cost. From this example, we clearly see the trap of a "naïve" approach which consists in looking at the economics of each outlet without a global vision of the network economics.
Neutralization of externalities: Costs are not what they seem
When the network is denser (case with two offices), it is seen that the turn-over generated is 100 as against 80 without the obligation. So the SGEI generates a positive externality on the revenue of the commercial activity. The advantage of the approach in terms of net avoided cost is that these additional revenues will be neutralized by a reduction in the amount of compensation. The net avoidable cost can be rewritten as:
Net avoidable cost=Cost(constrained network)-Cost(optimal network)-∆(TO)
Where ∆(TO) is the positive externality generated by the obligation on the turn-over (20 in our example). If the compensation is based on the net avoided cost, the aid will therefore be reduced by the exact amount of the externality. The mechanism is therefore neutral from the competitive viewpoint in the sense that the commercial activities do not benefit from the existence of the SGEI.
Since we know the Net Avoided Cost (or net incremental cost) of the SGEI, evaluated at 20, we can easily find the Stand Alone Cost of the commercial activity: 100-20=80.
This result can be surprising at first, since this stand alone cost of the commercial activity differs from the total cost of the commercial activity when the SGEI disappears. This cost (see table 2) is equal to 60.
This phenomenon appears because we have to take into account the turnover created thanks to the increase in post offices density. By creating a new office, the turnover of the commercial activities increases by 20. The "gross" incremental cost of the SGEI is 40 and we have to subtract the turnover created by the mission (20) to find the "net" incremental cost. The increase in the turnover of the commercial activity is neutralized by an increase of the cost of this activity, so that the result of the commercial products remains unchanged. Thanks to this method, the commercial activity is "neutral" between constructing its own network and with being associated with this SGEI (this reasoning is precisely the idea behind the stand alone cost concept). 
Fully distributed cost
The evaluation that has just been established in terms of net avoided cost is a minimum assessment of the SGEI cost. We must find the value of the common cost in order to perform the valuation of the fully distributed cost. The common cost F to the SGEI and the commercial activity can be calculated, for example, as:
F=Stand Alone Cost (SGEI) + Stand Alone Cost (commercial activity)-Total Cost
The unconstrained scenario which we have built enables us to calculate the stand alone cost when the network is constrained by the SGEI. This stand alone cost is equal to 80.
The total network cost in the constrained situation is observed. In order to find out the stand alone cost of the SGEI activity, we have seen that it was simpler to go through the incremental cost of the commercial activity in the network composed of two offices. This cost is equivalent to at least all the commercial activity (20 + 15 = 35) to which is added part of the "intrinsic" inactivity. Let us suppose for this example that the incremental inactivity is five 29 so that the incremental cost of the commercial activity is 40 (35+5). Consequently the stand alone cost of the SGEI is 100-40=60.
In this example, the common cost to SGEI and commercial activity is 40 (60+80-100) It remains to be seen how this common cost can be allocated between the SGEI and the commercial activity, knowing that the Commission's "framework" only tells us that the SGEI can cover an "adequate" contribution to common costs. In fact, there is no unanimously agreed method at this stage (see Braeutigam, 1980) for examples of allocation methods commonly used by regulatory authorities). The Postal Directive 30 indicates a distribution of these charges at the pro rata of the charges already allocated on the basis of causal inducers. By retaining this definition, we obtain the following results:
• The SGEI would bear 20 / (20 + 40) of the common costs (40), or 13.3. Its complete cost in accordance with the Directive would be 33.3.
• The commercial activity would bear 40 / (20 + 40) of the common costs (40), or 26.7. So its complete cost in accordance with the Directive would be 66,6.
28 Here, we define the neutrality as the maintaining of the profit in absolute value. A more financial approach would be to define the neutrality as a maintaining of the profit in percentage. The neutralisation of a turnover of 20 would thus be a transfer of 15. 29 See above for an explanation of the source of this inactivity. 30 Directive 97/67/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 15 December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of community postal services and the improvement of quality of service.
Summary
Returning to the numerical application, there are therefore the following possibilities in terms of jurisprudence: These results illustrate the fact that the cost of the SGEI can vary significantly according to the cost concept considered.
SGEI cost
Conclusion
An examination of the jurisprudence regarding predation has shown us that in the antitrust domain, common costs are not allocated to competitive activities. On the contrary, in matters of State aid, public service and commercial activity must both bear part of the common costs. While this last method has merit in that it introduces symmetry in the evaluation of SGEI costs and commercial activity costs, it can reveal a certain incoherence to economists confronted with the task of cost allocation. In fact, the method finally adopted may be a source of uncertainty, regarding the "reasonable" amount of common cost that the SGEI can bear, which will provoke, considering the stakes involved, a precautionary principle, consisting in allocating for safety's sake "too much" of the common costs to commercial activities.
It is, in fact, impossible for a corporate economist to know with certainty what proportion of common costs to assign to the transfer price, or similarly in what proportions consumers can benefit from scope economies. This allocation was previously left up to the initiative of the corporation, depending on its analysis of the markets, price elasticity, etc. The recent "framework" measures limit this initiative.
Moreover, they add a marked economic dimension to accounting allocations, by making the identification of common costs necessary. We have shown the complexity of such an analysis in the case of the accessibility SGEI, operated via the network of postal operators. If the calculation of the stand alone cost is relatively simple, the identification of the mission's incremental cost (and the common costs) relies on complex modeling. The existence of externalities generates economics phenomenon masked by the accounting results. This approach will require a thorough analysis from the European Commission in its investigations. The services of the commission did carry out such a detailed economic analysis in the "banque postale" decision, especially concerning the evaluation of externalities.
In order to neutralise the externalities generated by the exercise of the SGEI on the commercial activities, La Poste has had to conduct an analysis in term of net avoided cost. Such an analysis relies on the building of a reference scenario for which the operator is released from his public service obligation. In the case of the accessibility mission, it has therefore been necessary to identify the network that would be set up by La Poste if it were free to close the offices it wished to. This example will therefore also have allowed us to show that economic analysis is indispensable to the construction of the postal operators' analytical accounting 
